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DECENTRALIZATION IN CROATIA: 
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
 
Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović and Sunčana Slijepčević 
 
Abstract 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
In 2001 Croatian Government launched the initiative aimed at loosening a high degree of centralization by extending the mandates of 
local units and changing the sources of financing public functions. However, initial steps in the process of decentralisation have 
not been followed by additional measures of fiscal decentralization, and consequently its level has stayed broadly unchanged. We 
elaborate main problems and obstacles in relation with actual implementation of the decentralization process and give three 
groups of proposals for decentralisation: (i) division of mandatory authorities among different local units, (ii) change in funding and 
(iii) modified territorial division of the country. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The University Institute of European Studies (IUEE) is a public institution created in 1985 by the 
Autonomous Government of Catalonia (Generalitat) and the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). The 
IUEE is an interdisciplinary centre dedicated to higher education, training and research on European 
affairs. 
 
Our faculty includes experts from different Departments of the UAB (Law, Economics, History, Sociology, 
Political Science and International Relations) and from other universities in Catalonia. The IUEE also hosts 
prestigious visiting professors and young researchers from all over the world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The legislative framework of local and regional self-government in Croatia was formed with the passing of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in 1990. Croatia has today a two-tier system of sub-national 
government. Municipalities, towns and cities represent the local level of government and counties represent 
the regional level of government. The City of Zagreb has status of a local and regional level of government. 
Today the territory of Croatia consists of 429 municipalities and 126 towns (cities) at the local level, the City 
of Zagreb and of 20 counties at the regional level, which makes a total of 576 sub-national units. 
 
Decentralization can be generally described as a process in which selected functions are assigned to sub-
national units and fiscal decentralisation is described as the assignment of revenue sources and 
expenditure functions to sub-national levels of government. The theoretical and empirical literature shows 
that higher level of decentralisation of administrative power and responsibilities is expected to result in 
increase of public sector efficiency, in strengthening of local governance, as well as in increase of local 
development.  
 
Process of decentralisation in Croatia started in mid 2001. However, initial steps in the process of 
decentralisation have not been followed by additional measures of fiscal decentralization, and consequently 
its level has stayed broadly unchanged in recent years1. In the paper we show that fiscal capacities of local 
government units significantly differ. Also, we show that additional measures need to be undertaken to 
achieve efficient provision of public functions in Croatia.  
 
In the paper we analyse the process of decentralisation in Croatia and elaborate main problems and 
obstacles in relation with local government units and in the actual implementation of the decentralization 
process. In the third chapter we show that fiscal capacities of local government units significantly differ and 
that are, therefore, local government units faced with many problems in providing public functions. Problems 
with the conducted decentralisation of public functions and proposals for further decentralisation of local 
government units are given in the fourth chapter. The paper ends with final conclusions.  
 
                                       
1 Based on Jurlina Alibegović (2007a). 
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2. DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS IN CROATIA AND DIVISION OF AUTHORITIES 
AMONG DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT LEVELS 
 
Based on provisions of the Law on Local and Regional Self-Government Units, in Croatia exists clear 
division of authorities among different government levels. Municipalities and towns perform tasks of local 
significance, which directly address the needs of citizens and which are not assigned to state bodies by the 
Constitution or by the law. Big cities (cities with more than 35,000 inhabitants) and county centres are 
responsible for all local tasks and services for their citizens, including newly introduced tasks regarding 
public roads maintenance and issuing of building and location permits. Counties in their self-governing 
scope of authority are responsible for the functions of regional character (see Table 1). Towns with more 
than 35,000 inhabitants may be also responsible for functions which otherwise fall within the competence of 
counties, as long as they ensure the necessary conditions for performance of these services. 
 
Table 1: Mandatory authority of local and regional government units  
 
Municipalities and towns Big cities and county centres Counties 
- community and housing planning 
- physical planning and zoning 
- utility services  
- child-care  
- social welfare  
- primary health care  
- primary school education 
- culture, physical culture, and sports 
- consumer protection  
- protection and improvement of the 
natural environment 
- fire protection and civil defense 
- local transport 
 
- community and housing planning 
- physical planning and zoning 
- utility services  
- child-care  
- social welfare  
- primary health care  
- primary school education 
- culture, physical culture, and sports 
- consumer protection  
- protection and improvement of the natural 
environment 
- fire protection and civil defense 
- local transport 
- public roads maintenance 
- issuing of building and location permits 
- education 
- health care 
- physical planning and zoning 
- economic development  
- traffic and transport infrastructure 
- planning  and  development  of the 
network of educational, medical, 
social and cultural institutions  
- issuing of building and location 
permits and other document in 
relation to construction in the 
county area excluding the area of 
the big city  
Source: Authors’ systematisation. 
 
Special administration departments in cities and counties are responsible for state administration affairs that 
are transferred to the level of local and regional government. 
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In July 2001 Croatia launched partial decentralization of its public functions2. The decentralization reforms 
have been directed in two areas of decentralization: 
− delegation of administrative and professional tasks from central government (ministries) to local and 
regional government units, and 
− fiscal decentralization where part of financing public needs was transferred from the state  government 
budget to regional and local government budgets.  
 
In the first phase of fiscal decentralization, 323 financially stronger cities, the City of Zagreb and all of 20 
counties4 in Croatia have been assigned additional responsibilities to provide some of public functions 
locally. Adopted model of decentralization implied that expenditures for material expenses and capital 
investments in primary education are transferred to 32 big and/or financially stronger cities and counties 
budgets, as well as expenditures for material expenses and capital investments in secondary education, 
health care and social welfare sector are transferred to the counties budgets. Financing of fire protection 
was transferred to local government (municipalities and cities) (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Financing of public expenditures for decentralized responsibilities 
 
Decentralized 
responsibilities 
Counties, the City of Zagreb  
and cities (32) 
State budget 
Primary 
education 
− material and financial expenses  
− maintenance and investment expenses 
− fixed assets expenses 
− investment on nonfinancial fixed assets  
− wages and salaries  
− local transport expenses for employees  
− employer contributions 
− training  
− school IT equipment 
− library supply and equipment 
Secondary 
education 
− material expenses 
− local transport expenses for employees  
− co-financing of expenses for housing and organized 
meals for students in dormitories  
− maintenance and investment expenses 
− school equipment expenses  
− investment on nonfinancial fixed assets based on 
standards and benchmarks set up by the Minister 
decision 
− wages and salaries  
− local transport expenses for employees  
− training of teachers  
− expenses for teaching pupils in national 
minority language   
− expenses for teaching pupils with 
developmental difficulties  
− expenses for programmes for talented pupils  
− school IT equipment 
− library supply and equipment 
                                       
2 Based on Program of Fiscal Decentralisation (2002). Croatian Government described this process as the first phase of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
3 During the last nine years, only one more financially stronger city has taken new responsibilities in financing primary education. 
4 Total number of 53 selected local and regional government units that have been assigned decentralised functions represents 
only 9 percent of total number of local and regional government units in Croatia. 
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− co-financing of private schools programmes 
Social welfare − wages and salaries for employees in elderly persons 
centres 
− material and financial expenses of elderly persons 
centres 
− investment on nonfinancial fixed assets in elderly 
persons centres 
− material and financial expenses of social welfare 
centres  
− expense for grants to cover heating costs of social 
benefits users  
− employee expenses in social welfare 
institutions 
− nonfinancial fixed assets in social welfare 
institutions 
 
Healthcare − structure and equipment maintenance of the health 
institutions owned by the municipalities and the City of 
Zagreb  
− informatization of health institutions  
− wages and salaries 
− training 
− non-financial fixed assets 
Fire fighting − employee expenses in public fire brigades 
− material and energy expenses 
− financial expenses for public fire brigades 
−  
Source: Authors’ systematisation. 
 
 
3. INTERGOVERNAMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 
 
3.1. Revenue sources of sub-national government units 
 
The Law on Local and Regional Self-Government Financing is main legal framework of local government 
finance system. This law defines sources for financing of the operations of municipalities, towns (cities) and 
counties, various types of taxation, distribution of funds among the different levels, tax base, taxpayers, 
rates, as well as calculations and forms of tax payment.5 Table 3 contains short review of main revenue 
sources for financing local and regional self-government units in Croatia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
5 There are many other special laws that regulate other revenue sources for financing public tasks of sub-national governments. 
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Table 3: Review of revenue sources of local and regional self-government units 
 
Tax revenues Municipal, town and city taxes:  
Surtax on income tax  
Consumption tax  
Tax on vacation homes 
Tax on firm or name 
Tax on the use of public surfaces 
County taxes:   
Tax on inheritance and gifts 
Tax on motor vehicles   
Tax on boats and vessels  
Tax on gambling machines 
Nontax 
revenues 
Local government units’ revenues for which are the purpose set in advance (20 sorts of the local 
government units’ special purposes revenues out of 245 nontax revenues which are in Ministry of Finance 
(2010) Register of Non-tax Revenues).  
Capital  
revenues 
Revenues from financial asset (profit revenues of municipal owned company) 
Revenues from non-financial asset (rental revenues)   
Shared taxes 
 
Personal income tax:  
Central state – 0 percent 
Counties – 15.5 percent 
Municipalities and towns – 55 percent  
City of Zagreb – 70.5 percent  
Decentralized functions – 12 percent (primary education 3.1 percent; secondary education 2,2 percent; 
social care 2.2 percent; health care 3.2 percent; fire fighting –  1.3 percent) 
Equalisation fund (line-item in the state budget) – 17.5 percent  
Tax on real estate: 
Central state – 40 percent 
Municipalities and towns – 60 percent  
Grant 
revenues 
Grant revenues from the state budget allocated to the counties, cities and municipalities which belongs to 
the first and second category of special state concern.  
Grant revenues from the state budget allocated to the cities and municipalities for the personal income tax 
returns in the area of special state concern and in the hill and mountain areas.  
Grant revenues from the state budget allocated to the cities and municipalities for the profit tax returns in 
the area of special state concern and in the hill and mountain regions.  
Grant revenues from the state budget of other public bodies allocated to the cities and municipalities for the 
local development projects. 
Grant revenues from the state budget as equalisation fund allocated to the cities, municipalities and 
counties for financing decentralized functions. 
Borrowing  Previous approval by the Government of the Republic of Croatia for sub-national government 
borrowing. 
Total borrowing limit of local and regional self-government unit for fiscal year: up to 20 percent of outturn of 
current revenues in previous fiscal year.  
Additional borrowing limit for local and regional self-government unit: up to 2.3 percent of outturn of current 
revenues in previous fiscal year of all sub-national government units 
Source: Authors’ systematization. 
 
Local and regional self-government unit realise revenue through: own sources, shared taxes, grants from 
the state and county budget, equalisation grants for decentralised functions, shared revenues and 
borrowings.  
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Local governments’ own sources include income from local governments’ own property, from county, city, 
town or municipal taxes, from fines, fees and charges. 
 
Croatian law outlines the distribution of shared revenues between the state and local authorities. Local 
government units are entitled to the revenue from shared taxes and fees collected within their area, at a 
percentage stipulated by the law. Shared taxes are income tax and tax on real estate transactions. 
 
Sub-national government in Croatia is not autonomous in the determination of base and rates of tax 
revenue. The rates of shared taxes and of county taxes are completely prescribed by the state government. 
The rates of municipal, town and city taxes are on the whole determined by the municipal or city authority, 
but within the framework of the limits set by central government. The tax rate on the use of public surface is 
determined independently by the local government6. 
 
Local government units autonomously determine the rates of surtax on income tax within the limits (the 
maximum possible rate of surtax) set by the central government. From 2001 all local self-government units 
could introduce surtax. The current maximum rates of surtax are: 10 percent for municipalities, 12 percent 
for towns up to the 30,000 citizens and 15 percent for cities with more than 30,000 citizens, and up to 30 
percent for the City of Zagreb.  
 
The income realised through income tax is distributed in a manner that it distinguishes whether municipality, 
city or county finances or not decentralised functions in selected public services including education, health 
care, social welfare and fire fighting and with respect to the supported area7 that a local government unit 
belongs to. A distinct distribution of income tax is provided for the City of Zagreb. Within the area of local 
                                       
6 Fiscal autonomy means the capacity of local government units to fix the bases and tax rates as well as non-taxation revenue 
independently. 
7 Four special legal documents regulate supported areas in Croatia: Law on Areas of Special State Concern, Law on Hilly and 
Mountainous Areas, Law on Islands, and Law on Reconstruction and Development of the City of Vukovar. 275 municipalities and 
towns belongs to supported areas. There are municipalities and cities in the area of special state concern (180 local government 
units); municipalities and towns in hilly and mountainous areas (45 local government units) and municipalities and towns on 
islands (50 local government units). Total surface area of supported area is 64.3 percent of Croatian territory. 23 percent of 
Croatian population live in municipalities and towns in the area of special state concern. Based on current legal framework aiming 
to remove identified development problems in supported area, this area has been receiving different types of state aid assigned 
to local inhabitants, firms and local budgets (grants, fiscal subsidies, development financing etc.). Identified developmental 
problems comprise the following: social-economic underdevelopment, underdevelopment caused by geographic location (islands 
and hilly and mountainous areas) and area damaged by the war. Income tax revenue sharing in municipalities and towns in area 
of special state concern and in hilly and mountainous areas is different and these municipalities and towns receive higher share 
of income tax revenue (90 percent and the share of counties is 10 percent). 
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government units which have founded public fire brigades and which finance the regular work of the 
employees therein, the share of a municipality and town in income tax increases as a percentage of income 
tax (see Table 4). 
 
A share in the distribution of revenue from tax on real estate transactions for municipalities and cities is 60 
percent and for the state 40 percent.  
 
Regarding grants, a system of financing community needs has been designed in such a way that grants are 
used solely as funds to support local government units with poor fiscal capacity8.  
 
Equalisation grants for decentralised functions are ensured from the state budget to cover public expenses 
in the area of primary and secondary education, social welfare and health care, which are transferred to 
local and regional government units in the case if they do not have enough revenues from additional share 
of income tax for financing of decentralised functions. 
 
Shared revenues of the state, municipality, town and city is the revenue from agreed annual concession 
fees for pumping mineral and thermal water, and for the use of water for the public water supply.  
 
Apart from the a fore mentioned taxes and grants, local government units have numerous other revenues 
introduced on the basis of special acts and/or decisions of representative bodies, such as charges and fees, 
which are contained and stated in the non-tax revenues of their budget. Non-tax revenue is the autonomous 
revenue of sub-national government. Sub-national government units independently set the rates of non-tax 
revenue and independently carry out the collection of this revenue. The main non-tax revenue consists of 
municipal utility charges and contributions. These funds are used for the construction and maintenance of 
the utility infrastructure.  
 
Local and regional self-government units may incur debt in two ways: borrowing by taking a loan or issuing 
securities (municipal bonds). 
 
The Ministry of Finance has settled general principle on local and regional government borrowing. 
                                       
8 Every year Law on the Execution of the State Budget prescribes criteria for allocating grants to the local government units.  
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Municipalities, cities and counties can borrow resources for the purpose of capital investment financed from 
their budget, with previous approval by the Government of the Republic of Croatia. Counties can issue 
guarantees to the municipalities and cities with previous approval from the Croatian Government. 
Municipality, city and county can issue guarantees to the public institution or company that it owns or is a 
majority owner.  
 
All borrowing, guarantees and obligations cannot exceed maximal rate prescribed by the Law on the State 
budget. Total borrowing limit of local and regional self-government unit for fiscal year can be up to 20 
percent of outturn of current revenues in previous fiscal year. The amount of total borrowing limit includes 
the amount of annual loan annuity, liabilities regarding issuing securities and guarantees in previous year, 
as well as all unpaid liabilities. Additional borrowing limit for local and regional self-government unit is up to 
2.3 percent of outturn of current revenues in previous fiscal year of all sub-national government units. 
 
Since 2001, the revenue of sub-national government units has been increased substantially. It coincides 
with the beginning of the process of fiscal decentralisation and the increased share of sub-national 
government units in income tax. 
 
Table 4: Additional share of income tax for financing of decentralised functions 
 
  
The beginning of the decentralization 
process - July 1st, 2001 
Current 
situation 
Cities/municipalities      
share of income tax  32.0   55.0  
share of income tax for decentralised functions:  3.9   4.4  
primary education  2.9   3.1  
public fire brigades  1.0*   1.3  
The City of Zagreb     
share of income tax  45.0   70.5  
share of income tax for decentralised functions:  9.4   12.0  
primary education  2.9   3.1  
secondary education  2.0   2.2  
social welfare  2.0   2.2  
health care  2.5   3.2  
public fire brigades  1.0*  1.3  
Countries     
share of income tax  8.0   15.5  
share of income tax for decentralised functions:  9.4   10.7  
primary education  2.9   3.1  
secondary education  2.0   2.2  
social welfare  2.0   2.2  
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health care  2.5   3.2  
Share of income tax for equalization grants (line item in 
the state budget)  21   17.5  
Share of income tax for state government 29.6 0.0 
Note: *Since 2003 additional share of income tax for financing decentralized expenses of public fire brigades went to 
municipalities and towns that are establishers of public fire brigades. Income tax revenue sharing in municipalities and towns in 
area of special state concern and in hilly and mountainous areas is different and these municipalities and towns have received 
higher share of income tax revenue (90 percent and the share of counties is 10 percent). 
Source: Ministry of Finance.  
 
Implemented model of decentralization includes several changes in revenue sources. The first one is the 
possibility of introducing different levels of surtax on income tax depending on the size of the municipality. 
Distribution of revenues usually shared between the state and sub-national government has also been 
changed. The major change was in the distribution of income tax revenues9, with a larger part of revenues 
now being allocated to the local governments (55 percent), as well as to the regional government units (15.5 
percent). Additional part of income tax revenue (12 percent) was reserved for covering expenditures 
regarding decentralized functions in primary (3.1 percent) and secondary education (2.2 percent), health 
care (3.2 percent), social welfare (2.2 percent) and fire fighting (1.3 percent) (see Table 4). There have 
been established equalization grants for decentralized functions (17.5 percent of income tax) for local and 
regional government units that do not have enough resources (from additional share of income tax 
revenues) for financing decentralized functions. 
 
The decentralized functions are financed from the local budgets (from additional share of income tax), and 
additionally supported through the equalization grants to meet the required minimum service standards. The 
most of the health care and social welfare responsibilities are still the financial responsibility of the central 
government (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
9 Additional share of income tax for decentralised functions has been changed during period of last nine years. Table 4 contains 
review of additional share of income tax for financing of decentralized functions for the year 2001 and 2010. 
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3.2. Analysis of sub-national government units’ budgets 
 
Revenues outturn in local government units in Croatia is harmonised with IMF (2001) methodology10. Data 
in table 5 shows the structure of local government revenues in 2009.  
 
Total revenues of all local government units in Croatia totalled HRK 23.3 billion11 in 2009. Within the 
structure of total revenues of municipalities, towns and counties the most important category is tax 
revenues, with the share of 61.1 percent. The largest part of tax revenues is generated through taxes from 
income (55.1 percent of total revenues). Taxes on property are the second most important source of tax 
revenues, with the share of 3.9 percent in the total local government units’ revenues. Revenues from taxes 
on goods and services make 2.1 percent of total revenues of all local government units.    
 
The second most important source of total local government units revenues are revenues from grants. 
Grant revenues have a share of 8.7 percent in total local government units’ revenues.  
 
The administrative fee revenue is an important revenue source for local government units, and it generated 
18.4 percent of the total revenues. Local government units generate most of their administrative fee 
revenues from public utilities. The counties, unlike municipalities and towns, do not generate any revenues 
from public utilities, and the public utilities revenue is exclusively municipal, town, and city revenue. For 
better comparison of the significance of the public utility revenue, it is important to observe that in 2009 the 
municipalities, towns and City of Zagreb realised HRK 3.2 billion revenue from the public utilities, while the 
total fiscal revenue of all the counties was HRK 3.6 billion. 
 
The property income holds a significant portion of the total municipality, town, and county revenue, equalling 
7.3 percent. This revenue is largely visible in the town (and City of Zagreb) budgets, and in somewhat 
lesser extent in the municipality budgets, while it represents a less significant part of the county revenues. 
                                       
10 Since 2002 methodology of compiling fiscal statistics, as well as data about local government units’ revenues and expenditures 
in Croatia changed and became harmonised with International Monetary Fund (2001; IMF, 2001) methodology. This international 
guidelines for statistical methodology of compiling public finance statistic is harmonised with System of national accounts 1993 
(SNA 1993). The new revised methodology brought some changes in fiscal statistic with the goal of improving transparency. 
Therefore, classification of revenues and expenditures changed and now it includes next classification of public functions: 01 
General public services, 02 Defence, 03 Public order and safety, 04 Economic affairs, 05 Environmental protection, 06 Housing 
and community amenities, 07 Health, 08 Recreation, culture and religion, 09 Education and 10 Social protection.  
11 For comparison, exchange rate for one EUR is 7,375773 HRK. 
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There is a prominent difference in the fiscal revenue structure between counties, towns, and municipalities, 
when considering the levels of local and regional governments. 
 
In 2009 the total fiscal expenditure of municipalities, towns, and counties was HRK 25.3 billion. Within the 
structure of total expenditures the most important category, with the share of 30.5 percent, related to 
material expenditure. The expenditure for services, specifically for current and investment maintenance, and 
material and energy expenditure were prevalent in the structure of the material expenditure. All the local 
units have high material expenditures. 
 
The local government units also spent a lot on purchasing non-financial assets. These expenditures made 
23.2 percent of the total expenditure of the local units. These expenditures mostly regard acquisition of the 
tangible fixed assets, that is, purchase of buildings. Also, the towns and municipalities spend significantly 
more for these purposes than the counties. 
 
The third largest item of the expenditure was the expenditures for compensation of employees, which in 
2009 represented 18.4 percent of the total expenditure. These expenditures relates to salary and wages in 
local government units, as well as taxes and contributions. 
 
The current grants in form of cash and capital grants (and mostly issued to companies in the public sector) 
are the main reason for high other expenditures of municipalities, towns, and counties. The other 
expenditures represented as much as 14.9 percent of the total expenditures.  
 
For subsidies local units allocated 5.6 percent of their budgets in 2009. The largest part of subsidies local 
government units gave to the companies in the public sector. In this regard, the largest part of those 
subsidies was issued by the City of Zagreb. 
 
From the functional classification point of view, the expenditure structure of municipalities, towns and 
counties is predominated by the expenditures for housing and community amenity with 19.4 percent share 
in the total expenditure of the local government units. These resources are spent primarily on the 
community development, and on improving housing and various communal infrastructure projects. The 
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second largest part of expenditures was the expenditures for education with 18.2 percent share in the total 
expenditure, and these expenditures are mostly used to finance preschool and primary education. For 
general public services the local units allocated 18.1 percent of their budgets, and most of these resources 
were used to finance executive and legislative bodies. For economic affairs the local units allocated 15.9 
percent of their budgets. The expenditures for road traffic were the most important part of the expenditures 
for the economic affairs. The expenditures for recreation, culture, and religion made 12.7 percent of total 
local units’ expenditures. The remaining expenditures, according to the functional classification, had less 
than 10 percent share in the total local units’ expenditure. 
 
Detailed structure of the local budget expenditures by economic and functional classifications is shown in 
the tables 6 and 7. 
 
The major characteristics of the Croatian intergovernmental fiscal system are the following: tax revenues 
are the most important revenue source in the budget of sub-national units; the second most important 
revenue of sub-national government units is non-tax revenue; grants from the state government to local 
governments are the third revenues sources for sub-national government units.  
 
The previous short analysis of revenues and expenditures of local government units in Croatia leads to 
conclusion that local government units in Croatia are largely dependent on financing public functions from 
tax on income and from grants from state budget. The fiscal autonomy of sub-national government units in 
collecting their own revenue is relatively low. The sub-national government units obtain the least amount of 
revenue from their own taxes.  
 
Budgetary capacity of counties, towns and municipalities largely differ. 429 municipalities generate 15.8 
percent, 126 towns 39.9 percent, the City of Zagreb 28.9 percent and 20 counties 15.4 percent of total 
revenues of all local government units in Croatia. This data clearly show that when considering the future 
process of decentralization in Croatia, special attention has to be put on those local government units which 
largely contribute to the total budgetary revenues of sub-national government units, meaning on towns. In 
the same time, this means that change of mandatory authorities has to go in the direction of changing 
authorities and functions for municipalities. Municipalities have the lowest fiscal capacities for performing 
public functions. In the same time, they are largely dependent on grants from state budget.   
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If we stick to the view that regional self-government is the public government level which should be, in the 
greatest measure12, responsible for setting direction of regional development on the territory of Croatia, then 
also fundamental reform in this sector are necessary and should be expected. These changes should be 
undertaken towards creation of new regional authorities, which would then have adequate capacities 
(organisational, administrative, human resources, financial, and others) to carry out all the responsibilities in 
performing public functions and in strengthening the coordinating role of that level of public authority13. 
 
Table 5: Total revenues in local budgets in 2009, in percentage  
 
  Municipalities (429) 
Towns and cities 
(126) 
The City of 
Zagreb 
Counties 
(20) 
Total local 
budgets (576) 
OPERATING REVENUES 93.06 94.13 99.03 99.64 96.22 
Tax revenues 43.40 52.37 72.22 81.19 61.14 
Taxes on income and surtax on 
income tax 36.05 45.89 67.00 76.36 55.13 
Taxes on profits 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Taxes on property 6.11 5.09 3.03 0.07 3.88 
Taxes on goods and services  1.12 1.39 2.19 4.76 2.10 
Other taxes  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grants from foreign governments 
and from other general government 
units  20.53 8.64 0.82 11.75 8.74 
Property income 8.44 8.23 7.52 3.00 7.25 
Administrative fees 19.62 23.77 18.36 3.38 18.41 
Revenues of nonfinancial assets 
sales 6.94 5.87 0.97 0.36 3.78 
TOTAL REVENUES  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Finance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
12 Regional self-government should set directions of regional development in coordination with the central state, other local units 
and with all the important actors. 
13 Problem of insufficient financing and inadequate structure of expenditures in regional budgets are two of the most important 
obstacles at regional level in financing development projects of local and regional importance (Jurlina Alibegović, 2007b). 
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Table 6: Total expenses in local budgets in 2009 in percentage economic classification 
 
 Municipalities (429) 
Towns and 
cities (126) 
The City of 
Zagreb 
Counties 
(20) 
Total local 
budgets (576) 
OPERATING EXPENSES  66.43 76.54 79.42 83.91 76.82 
Compensation of employees                                11.86 21.48 19.87 14.21 18.39 
Use of goods and services 29.67 29.38 28.18 39.24 30.50 
Interests 0.80 1.31 0.76 0.98 1.02 
Subsidies 1.80 2.42 12.70 3.74 5.56 
Grants to foreign governments and 
to other general government units 1.97 0.62 0.79 6.73 1.78 
Social benefits 5.31 4.42 3.81 6.24 4.64 
Other expenses 15.02 16.90 13.32 12.77 14.94 
Expenses for nonfinancial 
assets 33.57 23.46 20.58 16.09 23.18 
TOTAL EXPENSES 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Finance.  
 
 
Table 7: Total expenses in local budgets in 2009, in percentage functional classification  
 
 Municipalities (429) 
Towns and 
cities (126) The City of Zagreb Counties (20) 
Total local budgets 
(576) 
General public services 25.28 17.06 15.30 18.33 18.05 
Defence 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Public order and safety 2.51 4.54 1.23 0.76 2.68 
Economic affairs 21.16 14.67 17.56 10.10 15.92 
Environmental protection 5.65 6.92 0.85 2.29 4.25 
Housing and community amenities 24.93 19.36 24.58 2.74 19.41 
Health 0.36 0.74 2.05 12.02 2.70 
Recreation, culture and religion 7.39 16.20 14.76 4.84 12.70 
Education 8.35 14.80 18.06 38.98 18.22 
Social protection 4.36 5.68 5.62 9.93 6.06 
TOTAL EXPENSES 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
 
3.3. Fiscal capacity of sub-national government units 
 
Fiscal capacity of regional or local government unit can be defined as the potential ability of the government 
in the region or in the city (municipality) to raise revenues from their own resources in order to pay for a 
standardised basket of public goods and services (Snah, 1997; Martinez-Vasquez and Boex, 1997). Fiscal 
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capacity can be also defined as the ability of governmental jurisdiction to translate economic activity within 
its geographic borders into public spending (Chernick, 1998). 
 
Table 8 shows the development in total fiscal capacity in countries, towns and municipalities in Croatia in 
2009.14 Results of measurement of the fiscal capacity with different indicators15 imply that there are large 
differences in the level of budget per capita between local government units in different counties. Total 
revenues per capita of counties, towns and municipalities in Croatia were between HRK 2,789 and HRK 
8,655. However, it has to be noticed that fiscal capacity of counties, towns and municipalities was 
significantly lower when we observe data about total revenues without grant revenues and share of income 
tax revenue for financing decentralized functions (revenues without grants). Average revenues are also 
significantly lower when exclude from the analysis City of Zagreb16. Thus, average revenues without grants 
(City of Zagreb excluded) decrease to 3,044 HRK per capita.   
 
Indicators of fiscal strength of counties, towns and municipalities also imply that there are large differences 
in outturn of different categories of revenues per capita. Some local government units have 20 times larger 
revenues from some sources than the others.17  
 
Differences in total expenditures per capita are even more pronounced. Total average expenditures per 
capita in counties, towns and municipalities were HRK 4,841 in 2009. Local government units in nine 
counties had expenditures above average.18 When we analyse data according to the functional 
classification of the budget, the highest differences can be seen in the level of expenditures for financing 
housing and community amenities, and for general public services. The lowest differences were in the 
expenditures for defence. This is not surprising having in mind expenditures for defence have low share in 
total local government units’ expenditures.19 
                                       
14 Data in table 8 shows aggregated data for municipalities, towns and counties divided according to the county in which in local 
government unit. Data about fiscal capacity in counties, towns and municipalities separately could be found in Annex.  
15 More about result of measuring fiscal capacity in Croatia in the period before 2009, with different indicators see in Jurlina 
Alibegović (2005). 
16 City of Zagreb does not have revenues from share of income tax revenue for financing decentralized functions and has very 
low revenues from grants.  
17 Examples are grants. City of Zagreb receives HRK 74 per capita from grants, while local government units in Lika-Senj County 
receive HRK 1,511 per capita from grants.   
18 Those are: City of Zagreb, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Lika-Senj, Zadar, Šibenik-Knin, Split-Dalmatia, Istria, Dubrovnik-Neretva and 
Zagreb County. 
19 Only local government units in Lika-Senj County have extremely high expenditures for defence per capita (HRK 18 per capita).  
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Expenditures for compensation of employees are also very important indicator of the fiscal capacity of local 
government units. Average expenditures for compensation of employees in local government units in 
Croatia were HRK 874 per capita in 2009. Local government units from seven counties had above average 
expenditures for employees. Data about the share of expenditures for compensation of employees in total 
revenues, as well as in the revenues without grants shows capability of municipalities, towns and counties 
to pay wages and salaries of their employees in their own administration using only total revenues or their 
own revenues. Average share of expenditures for employees in total revenues of local government units in 
Croatia amounted 19.9 percent in 2009. Expenditures for compensation of employees above that average 
had local government units in nine counties. Similar, the share of expenditures for compensation of 
employees in total expenditures amounted 18.4 percent. Eight counties had expenditures for that purposes 
above that average.  
 
In addition, there are large differences between local government units in counties in subsidies, material 
expenditures and grants per capita (table 8).  
 
Table 8: Financial capacity of all local government units in Croatia, per capita, in HRK 
 
Year 2009 Average Minimum Maximum 
According to the economic classification of the budget 
OPERATING EXPENSES  4,290.4 2,672.3 8,571.4 
Tax revenues  2,597.5 1,580.9 6,250.6 
Share of income tax revenue from equalization grants for financing decentralized 
functions  
406.9 0.0 617.8 
Grant revenues  578.9 71.2 1,511.4 
Property income 308.6 78.2 921.3 
Administrative fees 770.2 312.3 1,762.7 
Total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax revenue for financing 
decentralized functions 
3,304.7 1,677.7 8,500.1 
OPERATING EXPENSES 3,662.2 2,192.2 7,633.0 
Expenditures for compensation of employees  874.2 479.2 1,909.6 
Use of goods and services 1,519.4 808.8 2,708.1 
Subsidies 164.0 29.6 1,220.5 
Grants 94.0 12.4 201.2 
TOTAL REVENUES 4,486.4 2,788.9 8,655.3 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 4,840.6 3,021.2 9,610.6 
According to the functional classification of the budget 
Expenditures for general government services  973.9 576.9 2,048.8 
Expenditures for defense 1.4 0.0 18.1 
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Expenditures for public order and safety 159.3 71.6 337.4 
Expenditures for economic affairs 713.7 370.2 1,687.7 
Expenditures for environment protection 231.9 56.4 648.9 
Expenditures for housing and community amenity 873.9 347.7 2,362.0 
Expenditures for health 144.6 60.4 284.9 
Expenditures for recreation, culture and religion 552.7 216.8 1,419.0 
Expenditures for education  900.7 629.8 1,735.3 
Expenditures for social protection 288.6 127.1 539.8 
Note: Item total revenues without grants means total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax revenue for 
financing decentralized functions. 
Source: Authors calculations based on data from Ministry of Finance and Croatian Bureau of Statistic.  
 
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DECENTRALIZATION 
 
4.1. Critical view on the process of decentralisation in Croatia 
 
The first set of our conclusions concerns realisation of local budgets and their fiscal capacities which are the 
result of the existing legal framework which stipulates the ways in which municipalities, towns, and counties 
can generate their fiscal revenues and spend them in an optimum manner. The number of revenue sources 
on which local government units can autonomously influence (on their base and/or rate) is small. Local 
government units have only influence on the tax on the use of public surfaces and partly on the nontax 
revenues that the local government units stipulate as special purpose revenues through special regulations. 
Municipalities, towns, and counties can independently control the rate level for certain types of revenues, 
but within the limits stipulated by the central state. The result is that more than half of the total revenue in 
the local government units’ budgets consists of revenues on which amount local government units cannot 
influence (revenues from the income tax which is shared tax revenue, and grants). The administrative fees 
and special regulation revenues form almost one fifth of the total revenue, and these are the revenues on 
which local government units have only partial influence. 
 
Respecting the existing legal solutions resulted in the existing level and structure of the total expenditures of 
municipalities, towns, and counties. Approximately half of the total expenditures of municipalities, towns, 
and counties are related to the current expenditures for financing the functioning of the local government 
(expenditures for goods and services and expenditures for compensations of the employees). The local 
budgets use a little bit less than one quarter of the total expenditure to finance development, i.e. capital 
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expenditures. According to the functional classification of the budget, it can be observed that the local 
government is mostly concerned about (and finances) public functions of housing and community amenity, 
preschool and primary school education, general public services, and road traffic (within the economic 
affairs). 
 
There is a significant difference between fiscal strengths of different municipalities, towns, and counties in 
Croatia, and there is a significant difference in the level of realisation of certain revenue items per capita. 
The amount of revenues generated by the counties is significantly lower than the one generated by towns, 
but also than the one generated by the most municipalities. Such data confirms poor fiscal capabilities of 
counties to provide quality public services. The fiscal capacities of towns in Croatia significantly differ, 
because as many as 77 out of 127 towns have total revenue per capita below average. As far as the 
municipalities are concerned, their fiscal capability of financing their own requirements differs extremely, 
and approximately 70 percent of municipalities have revenues (grants excluded) below average. However, 
the municipality revenues are in no correlation with the amount of grants received from the state budget. 
 
Apart from that, there are a large number of municipalities and towns that have special financing status.20 
The special financing status consists of various forms of reliefs, benefits, supports and grants for population, 
economic subjects, and local budgets which in various ways have impact on the decrease (through 
uncollected revenues from reliefs and benefits) and/or increase (through grant revenues) of the revenue 
side of the local budgets. 
   
Municipality, town or county should generate such amount of revenues that ensure that local government 
units can cover all necessary public expenditures stipulated by the law. The real question is whether the 
revenue structure described, and, even more, expenditure structure, as well as indicators of the fiscal 
strength of municipalities, towns, and counties, allow the increase of local government units responsibilities 
to provide public services to their citizens, as well as the increase of awareness of local government units of 
the need to rely on their own fiscal capacities in order to execute public tasks. 
 
In this part of the paper we additionally analyse the data about realisation the local budgets in revenues and 
expenditures of the consolidated general government and in GDP in order to evaluate how much local 
                                       
20 Areas of special state concern, hill and mountain regions, islands, City of Vukovar and local government units which finance 
decentralised functions.  
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government units truly contribute to the realisation of revenues and expenditures of the consolidated 
general government and to GDP, once all the mutual transactions between different levels of government 
cancel each other. 
 
Table 9: Revenues and expenditures of sub-national government in revenues and expenditures of the 
consolidated general government and in GDP, in percentage 
 
Year 
Revenues of sub-national government units  Expenditures of sub-national government units 
Outturn 
in 000 HRK 
In % of consolidated 
general government 
revenues 
In 
% of 
GDP 
Outturn 
in 000 HRK 
In % of consolidated 
general government 
expenditures 
In 
% of 
GDP 
2000 8,155,966 10.93 5.35 8,263,723 10.04 5.42 
2001 6,953,953 8.82 4.12 7,321,974 8.71 4.28 
2002 8,332,799 10.05 4.00 8,335,141 10.25 4.00 
2003 8,456,146 9.47 3.72 9,239,693 10.58 4.07 
2004 9,407,683 9.76 3.83 8,599,052 9.12 3.50 
2005 10,458,468 10.14 3.96 9,713,927 9.66 3.67 
2006 11,901,172 10.60 4.16 10,469,573 9.72 3.66 
2007 13,379,019 10.56 4.26 11,819,047 9.95 3.76 
2008 14,747,477 10.95 4.31 13,650,745 10.48 3.99 
2009 14,615,102 10.86 4.39 13,460,196 10.12 4.04 
Note: Due to a change in the way of collecting data about sub-national government outturn in fiscal year 2001 and later, Ministry 
of Finance publishes only data from 53 local government units (20 counties, City of Zagreb and 32 big cities which cover 
decentralisation function in education).  
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
The share of revenues and expenditures of sub-national government in the total government budget 
revenues and expenditures, as well as share of these revenues in GDP - before and after 2001 – could 
indicate size of undertaken fiscal decentralization. In 2001 the process of decentralization started. 
Unfortunately, the Ministry of Finance does not have a whole data base on outturn of local government 
budgets. The reason is change in methods for collecting and distributing data (change in programme of 
collecting data on local budgets). Consequently, the Ministry of Finance disposes with 70 percent of local 
budgets21. On the basis of available data, the share of local budget revenues in consolidated general 
government budget revenues totalled 8.8 percent and 4.1 percent in GDP (Table 9). Data for 2002, the first 
                                       
21 This 70 percent of local budgets covers 53 local government units (21 counties and 32 big cities) out of 576 as total number of 
local government units that, by law and government decree, cover decentralized functions in primary and secondary education, 
social welfare and health care. 
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year after the launch of decentralization, indicates that the share of local budget revenues in consolidated 
revenues of the general government budget totalled 10.1 percent, and their share in GDP amounted to 4 
percent.  
 
Data for 2009 shows that level of decentralisation only slightly changed compared to the 2001.  The share 
of local budget revenues in consolidated revenues of the general government budget increased to 10.9 
percent, while share of local budget expenditures in consolidated general government expenditures 
decreased to 10.1 percent in 2009. This is the clear sign that the goal of achieving higher participation of 
local budgets in consolidated general government budget is still not achieved.  
 
All this data clearly show that Croatia is a highly centralised country based on two important indicators: the 
share of revenues and expenditures of sub-national government in GDP and the share of revenues and 
expenditures of sub-national government in the total government budget revenues and expenditures (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Revenues and expenditures of sub-national governments in revenues and expenditures of 
consolidated general government and in GDP, in percentage  
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Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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The analysis of the current financing of decentralised functions in Croatia for the 2001-2009 period leads to 
a series of conclusion about the past process of decentralisation in Croatia. 
 
The most of the existing ten public functions are still under jurisdiction of the central state. This is also the 
case with four public functions that are partially decentralised (education, health, social protection, and fire 
protection), since responsibilities and expenditures for their financing are still divided between the central, 
and local and regional levels of government. 
 
Financing decentralised functions is still realised from two sources, to the lesser extent from local budget 
revenues (from additional part of the income tax), and to the more significant extent from the central budget 
revenues (from the grant equalisation fund for financing decentralised functions). 
 
The existing decentralisation of the competencies and of financing part of public functions did not 
strengthen the responsibility of municipalities, towns, and counties, nor has it enhanced their autonomy in 
providing decentralised public function. Also, it has not increase local government units responsibility in 
securing other public services that are the nearest to the citizens or the degree of their responsibility in 
performing other public functions from their competence. The responsibility and resources to perform 
decentralised public functions are still divided between the central state and local levels of government, 
where the local level of government very limitedly participate in decision making on dividing that 
responsibility and finances. 
 
Only one quarter of Croatian towns took over the obligation of decentralised financing of the part of the 
primary school expenditures22, while the existing legal possibility for financing part of the school 
expenditures has not yet been exploited by further sixty local units, each with more than 8,000 citizens, 
which did not took over the responsibility for decentralised financing of the part of the primary school 
expenditures. 
 
In Croatia there are significant differences in budget capacities between counties, towns, and municipalities. 
429 municipalities generate 15.8 percent, 126 towns 39.9 percent, the City of Zagreb 28.9 percent, and 20 
counties 15.4 percent of the total local budget revenue in Croatia. The authorities of all the municipalities 
                                       
22 In total, 33 towns and City of Zagreb. 
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and towns (with the exception of large towns) in performing public affairs are the same, no matter what their 
development level, fiscal capacity or size is. Large towns, that is, those towns that have over 35,000 
inhabitants or that are county seats are exception. They can also conduct tasks from the authorities of the 
counties. Such a defined system of municipality and town authorities has numerous shortcomings. One of 
the more important shortcomings is that municipalities and towns can not perform public functions with the 
same level of quality because they have different degree of development, fiscal capacity, and the size. 
Small municipalities and towns with low fiscal capacity cannot fully comply with the requirement to provide 
the same kind and same quality of public service to their citizens as large towns which have higher fiscal 
capacity. 23 
 
Local government units have a small number of financing instruments on which they can influence or on 
which they can at least sufficiently influence (by changing the rates within law stipulated limits) to collect 
needed resources to finance their authorities and tasks. 
 
Despite the fact that the total number of fiscal instruments on which they can influence is small, 
municipalities and towns still have legally defined potential possibilities to influence the level of the collected 
fiscal resources. Municipalities and towns can set the tax rate of one tax revenue by their own decision, and 
they can set the tax rate of other tax revenues by their own decision within a legally stipulated range. 
However, although they do have limited possibility of influence, municipalities and counties use insufficiently 
these fiscal instruments.24 Unlike municipalities and towns, the counties are almost completely denied by 
law the possibility to autonomously prescribe county taxes.25  
 
                                       
23 The reasons behind this situation are twofold: lack of their own capacities and financial resources, and economics of scale, that 
make providing public service to a small number of users more expensive. 
24 Out of 213 municipalities (50 percent of the total number of municipalities) and 75 towns (59 percent of the total number of 
towns) that introduced surtax on the income, only 41 municipalities and 9 towns introduced the maximum legally allowed rate of 
surtax. City of Dubrovnik is the only town with the status of a large city that introduced the maximum legally allowed rate of surtax. 
That means that only 9 percent of all the units of local self-government in Croatia (9.6 percent of municipalities and 7 percent of 
towns) introduced the maximum legally allowed rate of surtax on the income. Introducing the maximum surtax rate would 
generate 5.9 percent higher revenues to all the towns (City of Zagreb excluded) compared to the current revenues from the 
income tax and surtax (without the equalization grant and income tax returns), and municipalities would generate 6.7 percent 
higher revenues compared to their current revenues from the income tax and surtax. That would also mean that if the 
municipalities and towns had introduced the highest possible rates of surtax and thus made additional tax burden on their 
inhabitants, their total debt would have been less by half than the existing level of debt. 
25 Since county taxes are stipulated by law in such a way that the county authorities do not have any freedom to prescribe any 
changes in the base or the rate. 
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The criteria for assigning grants to the local government units in Croatian practice are not based on the 
calculation of fiscal capacity, but they change every year. In the same manner, every year bring new or 
changed criteria for assigning current grants from the state budget to the counties. Counties then these 
grants assign to municipalities and towns in their region. Due to insufficiently transparent criteria for 
assigning the grants defined in the Budget Execution Act, and also because these criteria are subject to 
annual changes, municipalities, towns, and counties have reduced ability to plan their resources.  
 
Since those are mostly capital grants, which mean that these resources are mostly used for financing 
development projects, it is clear that in the future the grant criteria should be defined at least in the three 
year fiscal period. That way, local government units could plan their development priorities and 
expenditures in the longer term. 
 
The level of the total borrowing of the local government units in Croatia is defined by the central state 
through annual enactment of the measures to limit borrowing of local units, compliant with the Budget Act, 
Budget Execution Act and Regulations on Borrowing Procedure for Local Units and on Issuing Guarantees 
to Local Units. There are two key limitations on local units borrowing. The first limitation puts limits on 
borrowing of all the local units, and the second limitation concerns borrowing of an individual local unit. The 
problem which should be pointed out here concerns lack of transparency in the criteria for getting the 
approval from the Government of the Republic of Croatia for borrowing of municipalities, towns, and 
counties within the boundaries of the maximum allowed level of borrowing of all the local government 
units.26   
 
The real decentralisation also carries clear responsibilities for local government units. Local budgets have to 
depend as little as possible on the state budget to finance their obligations (current activities and 
development projects). If a local unit with its local budget revenues is incapable of financing even its current, 
legally stipulated affairs, then it cannot justify execution of its basic reason of existence - efficient meeting of 
public needs of its citizens. In case when a local unit cannot finance a development project important to its 
citizens from its own budget, prior to allocating the resources from the state budget, there is a possibility of 
increasing fiscal capacity by joining/merging with a neighbouring local government unit in providing this 
                                       
26 Namely, there are no clear criteria (with the exception that the requests are to be solved in the order in which they were 
received) which would enable local government units to use the possibility of the total borrowing capacity regulated in the annual 
Budget Execution Act. 
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project/activity. If the local units are not able to realise this in practice, then the attempt to organise 
distribution of public functions so that those public functions that are closer to the local community are also 
decentralised actually does not have a lot of sense.  
 
Local and regional self-government units in Croatia are highly dependent on tax revenue sharing (income 
tax) and grants from the central government. The fiscal capacities of local government units differ 
significantly, while all municipalities and all cities (except big cities and cities that are county centres) have 
equal authorities. Consequently, it is not possible to ensure the comparable quality of public services. In 
order to address these imbalances, in the next part of paper we consider possible solutions for 
decentralisation in Croatia27. 
 
 
4.2. Possible solutions for decentralisation in Croatia 
 
In this part of the paper we are giving only short guidelines and proposals for further fiscal decentralization 
in Croatia, aimed at ensuring more equal and more efficient provision of public services. Our proposals for 
decentralization can be grouped in three main areas: 
 
(i) a clear division of mandatory authorities among different local units,  
(ii) a change in funding of the local units, and  
(iii) a modified territorial division of the country. 
 
A division of mandatory authorities among municipalities, towns, big cities, county centres and regions in 
Croatia are seen as fundamental requirement for future efficient decentralization. In the next table we 
propose division of mandatory authorities among local government units in Croatia. 
 
 
 
 
                                       
27 The same conclusions are given at recently organized Roundtable on regional and local self-government in Croatia organized 
by HAZU (Barbić, 2010). 
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Table 10: A clear divisions of mandatory authorities among municipalities, cities, big cities, and regions 
 
Municipalities − financing children’s day-care 
− financing municipal waste transport and management 
− financing the maintenance of public areas 
− financing public fire fighting brigades 
− financing unclassified roads and public lighting 
Towns Mandatory authorities of municipalities and 
− financing public libraries 
− financing public utility services 
− financing water supply and drainage 
− financing primary and secondary education 
− financing social welfare centres 
Big cities/ 
County centres 
Mandatory authorities of cities and 
− management of primary healthcare 
− financing of cultural institutions 
− financing of public roads 
Regions − handling the networks of agencies and institutions providing public services (establishing a network of 
primary and secondary healthcare, pre-school educational institutions, primary and secondary education, 
social protection institutions, and cultural institutions)  
− financing secondary healthcare and financing primary and secondary education in municipalities and cities 
of the region which do not support the costs of primary and secondary education 
− funding some of the public services which had previously been provided by state administration offices in 
the county, as well as physical planning and environmental protection 
Source: Authors’ systematization. 
 
A change in funding of the local units is related to their mandatory authorities and should provide stable, 
adequate and foreseeable revenue. The first set of proposals refers to modification of the existing mode of 
financing and includes changing the income tax surtax rates and using surtax revenues in determining the 
amount of central government grants extended to local self-government units; modifying the purpose of 
communal contribution, and measures focused on the management of property owned by local and regional 
self-governments. The second set consists of reform proposals - they ask for the new role of property tax 
which would replace communal fees, the application of formulas to share total revenues with the central 
government, the definition of criteria for the allotment of grants to local units, and introduction of incentives 
for the joint provision of public functions and/or financing of development projects by several local self-
government units. 
 
A modified territorial division of the country is result of application of fiscal autonomy principles for local units 
aimed at efficient provision of mandatory authorities. The division should be based on three main criteria: i) 
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population size; ii) fiscal capacity and iii) economic structure.28 The first criterion proposes a minimal 
number of 2,000 inhabitants for a municipality, 10,000 inhabitants for a city, and 35,000 inhabitants for a big 
city. The second criterion defines standard expenditure for mandatory authorities and standard revenues for 
municipalities and cities. Based on the factor and cluster analysis29 and taking into account the efficiency of 
providing public services, it is proposed that Croatia is divided into seven larger regions that consist of 
several counties. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The initiated decentralization process in Croatia should be continued. Given that decentralization is a 
delegation of authority, responsibility, and resources from a higher government level to the local and 
regional level, it is necessary to ensure that provision of responsibility is transparent at all administration 
levels.  
 
The future implementation of the decentralization process enquires for independence of local self-
government units, both in performing the tasks and in the collection of revenues. In doing so, it is crucial to 
“provide approximately equal possibilities for the provision of services to their citizens”, which is possible 
only through the transparent and constant re-defining of equalisation grants in the proposed fiscal 
decentralisation model. 
 
Implementation of decentralization process should involve active participation of all key stakeholders at the 
central, regional and local level of government with expert help of scientific institutions, NGOs, civil society 
and all other interested institutions and individuals in the transparent decentralization process. 
 
Together with the existence of the political will, the most important prerequisite for successful 
decentralisation is to set clear goals of decentralisation (administrative, fiscal, and territorial), activities and 
measures for its realisation, identify entities responsible for execution of activities and measures, define the 
                                       
28 In addition to these criteria some other factors should be taken into consideration when deciding about new territorial division of 
the country, such as: historical factors.  
29 Details about factor and cluster analysis conducted, main assumptions and statistical data used in the analysis to propose new 
territorial division of the country can be found in Institute of Economics, Zagreb (2010).  
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expected results and effects (outcomes), and create a political consensus among all the important 
participants regarding the need to reform public administration with special focus on the reform of the 
system of local and regional self-government. In conclusion of this paper we are stating only the most 
important goals of decentralisation. Cogitating on realisation of other important pre-requirements for 
successful decentralisation is not the object of consideration in this paper and we leave them to the 
exponents of the public policy. 
 
Among the most important goals of decentralisation, there is more efficient provision of public services in 
order to fulfil the needs of local inhabitants in the best manner possible. 
 
Clear division of authorities between the central state and lower levels of government should enable more 
efficient provision of public services. Responsibilities for performing public functions should be harmonised 
with the financial resources. 
 
Efficient administrative and territorial organisation of the state should come as a result of transparent 
functional and fiscal decentralisation. That is also the reason why the important goal of decentralisation is to 
minimise municipality, town, and county dependence on the central state grants and to promote financial 
independence of local government units in financing compulsory authorities. 
 
The goal of decentralisation is also to encourage cooperation between local government units in joint 
provision of public services and in financing development projects of mutual interest to more than one local 
unit.  
 
The modern approach to local development has increasing tendency towards participation of a broader 
range of subjects interested in individual development programmes and projects. Cooperation of public and 
private sector, combined with letting part of public services to the care of non-government sector and 
privatisation of public services, is one of the goals in providing public services efficiently. 
 
There are new responsibilities for the local authorities that come with the decentralisation process, and 
these responsibilities require significantly different knowledge and skills necessary for their execution. One 
of the more important goals of decentralisation is that the new public administration should be founded on 
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the approach to provide public services and their financing, since the citizens of local government units 
expect far greater responsibilities and orientation towards outputs and outcomes with savings of public 
resources in execution of public functions. 
 
Also, it is necessary to build a system of clear criteria. Building is among the most important goals of 
decentralisation. There are numerous areas in which the effort should be made to establish clear criteria. 
Measurement of fiscal capacity has to be specifically point out as a basis for establishing required level of 
assistance form the central state, and establishment of the structure and the number of local units. 
 
Establishing the appropriate administrative and territorial organisation is the final goal of decentralisation. 
Decentralisation should be such to support and allow efficient provision of public services, and the system 
itself should be based on compulsory authorities in execution of public functions and on transparent 
financing. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1: Indicators of fiscal capacity for counties, per citizen, in HRK 
 
Number of counties: 20 Average Minimum Maximum 
OPERATING EXPENSES  974.6 787.2 1,208.5 
Tax revenues  757.3 243.3 1,018.1 
Share of income tax revenue from equalization grants for 
financing decentralized functions  
314.2 14.7 447.9 
Grant revenues  155.8 49.2 869.7 
Property income 29.8 6.0 55.7 
Administrative fees 28.3 15.1 90.8 
Total revenues without grant revenues and share of income 
tax revenue for financing decentralized functions 
504.6 286.6 843.0 
OPERATING EXPENSES 841.6 685.2 1,086.5 
Expenditures for compensation of employees  140.2 90.5 272.2 
Use of goods and services 400.1 211.5 573.9 
Subsidies 34.8 10.4 59.6 
Grants 59.1 6.3 111.1 
TOTAL REVENUES 978.4 796.3 1,208.5 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 1,009.0 819.0 1,276.4 
Expenditures for general government services  194.5 115.1 360.9 
Expenditures for defense 0.1 0.0 1.1 
Expenditures for public order and safety 7.3 0.0 11.6 
Expenditures for economic affairs 94.3 34.0 185.9 
Expenditures for environment protection 18.7 1.1 44.2 
Expenditures for housing and community amenity 24.3 0.0 67.2 
Expenditures for health 122.1 54.6 196.1 
Expenditures for recreation, culture and religion 44.8 9.9 98.2 
Expenditures for education  401.1 270.2 669.5 
Expenditures for social protection 101.8 28.9 253.3 
 
Note: item total revenues without grants means total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax revenue for 
financing decentralized functions. 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Ministry of Finance (2010a) and Central Bureau of Statistics (2002).  
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ANNEX 2: Indicators of fiscal capacity for cities, per citizen, in HRK 
 
Number of cities and towns: 127 (City of Zagreb included) Average Minimum Maximum 
OPERATING EXPENSES  3,734.5 948.2 10,533.3 
Tax revenues  1,969.0 464.9 6,250.6 
Share of income tax revenue from equalization grants for 
financing decentralized functions  
120.5 0.0 997.3 
Grant revenues  531.8 20.2 3,563.3 
Property income 281.1 14.5 1,785.4 
Administrative fees 904.4 89.5 4,258.6 
Total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax 
revenue for financing decentralized functions 
3,082.2 683.1 9,735.3 
OPERATING EXPENSES 3,211.5 886.9 8,968.1 
Expenditures for compensation of employees  885.4 99.0 2,618.1 
Use of goods and services 1,274.7 278.2 4,178.5 
Subsidies 74.0 0.0 1,220.5 
Grants 28.9 0.0 471.6 
TOTAL REVENUES 4,023.0 968.2 11,594.3 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 4,360.0 1,324.8 13,486.3 
Expenditures for general government services  842.1 168.4 2,368.6 
Expenditures for defense 3.2 0.0 256.7 
Expenditures for public order and safety 198.5 0.0 957.5 
Expenditures for economic affairs 717.2 0.0 4,667.6 
Expenditures for environment protection 307.5 0.0 4,861.3 
Expenditures for housing and community amenity 906.4 0.0 4,239.1 
Expenditures for health 34.3 0.0 1,078.2 
Expenditures for recreation, culture and religion 573.1 93.5 3,794.3 
Expenditures for education  571.7 15.0 3,415.2 
Expenditures for social protection 206.1 0.0 1,026.0 
 
Note: item total revenues without grants means total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax revenue for 
financing decentralized functions. 
Source: author calculation based on data from Ministry of Finance (2010a) and Central Bureau of Statistics (2002).  
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Annex 3: Indicators of fiscal capacity for municipalities, per citizen, in HRK 
 
Number of municipalities: 429 Average Minimum Maximum 
OPERATING EXPENSES  3,010.0 506.7 16,993.6 
Tax revenues  1,253.5 185.7 7,882.5 
Share of income tax revenue from equalization grants for 
financing decentralized functions  
19.3 0.0 1,874.8 
Grant revenues  812.1 0.0 15,727.9 
Property income 263.0 0.0 6,741.9 
Administrative fees 639.9 12.0 9,059.0 
Total revenues without grant revenues and share of income 
tax revenue for financing decentralized functions 
2,178.6 288.1 15,252.5 
OPERATING EXPENSES 2,350.1 352.9 13,330.0 
Expenditures for compensation of employees  425.9 43.4 4,211.3 
Use of goods and services 1,079.5 180.7 7,671.4 
Subsidies 51.4 0.0 1,584.1 
Grants 74.3 0.0 1,744.1 
TOTAL REVENUES 3,227.4 507.4 18,335.4 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 3,617.8 646.5 34,828.2 
Expenditures for general government services  976.9 0.0 13,034.3 
Expenditures for defense 0.4 0.0 29.2 
Expenditures for public order and safety 88.4 0.0 1,691.5 
Expenditures for economic affairs 819.2 0.0 26,389.2 
Expenditures for environment protection 211.7 0.0 8,231.8 
Expenditures for housing and community amenity 856.1 0.0 9,211.4 
Expenditures for health 11.4 0.0 908.3 
Expenditures for recreation, culture and religion 250.6 0.0 3,729.4 
Expenditures for education  259.4 0.0 4,840.9 
Expenditures for social protection 143.5 0.0 4,271.1 
 
Note: item total revenues without grants means total revenues without grant revenues and share of income tax revenue for 
financing decentralized functions. 
Source: author calculation based on data from Ministry of Finance (2010a) and Central Bureau of Statistics (2002).  
